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PROPOSED ILLINOIS LEGISLATION PROVIDING FOR
FORECLOSURE OF MORTGAGES BY MEANS
OF POWER OF SALE
Recent depression experience has created opposition to foreclosure of mort-
gages by judicial proceedings on the grounds that they are slow and expensive.
In Illinois the proposed Real Estate Mortgage Act" seeks to remedy these de-
fects by providing, among other things,2 for mortgage foreclosure without court
action by means of the exercise of a statutory power of sale. The desirability of
such legislation depends on whether it affords a speedy, inexpensive method
of foreclosure without endangering the rights of interested parties.
The Illinois bill has the generally accepted advantages of foreclosure under
statutory power of sale. First, it is simple. A mortgagee who wishes to fore-
close merely delivers to the sheriff (or master)3 the mortgage, the evidences
of indebtedness which it secures, and a written direction to sell the mortgaged
property. The direction to sell contains an itemized statement of the aggregate
amount of the indebtedness claimed to be due and a list of interested parties
entitled to receive notice of the date of sale by mail. Within five days after the
delivery of the papers, the sheriff records the direction to sell, and within ten
days after delivery publishes the first of three weekly notices advertising the
sale. Within ten days of the first publication, copies of the advertisement must
be mailed to interested parties, i.e., the mortgagor, assignees of the mortgage,
subsequent encumbrancers, and judgment lienholders who have recorded their
interests. The sale is conducted by the sheriff, who applies the proceeds to
payment of the debt and any subordinate liens. A certificate of sale is issued
to the purchaser, and after the redemption period a deed is issued.
The second advantage of the power of sale provisions of the new Illinois bill
is that foreclosure expenses will be reduced. Since the mortgagee can foreclose
without court action, he does not have to pay service fees and court costs in
most cases. 4 Furthermore, the smaller amount of legal work necessary when
' Ill. S. 320, Art. V (1939).
The bill also contains provisions affecting foreclosure by action, redemption rights, rights
to rents and possession, receiver's powers, deficiency judgments, trust deeds and trust in-
dentures. Ill. S. 32o (1939).
3 Hereafter, whenever the word "sheriff" is used it includes masters.
4 Service fees in the average foreclosure action in Chicago run from $15 to $35. Court
costs average around $3o; this includes a $15 filing fee and an average court reporter expense of
$15. These expenses, however, are eliminated only if the foreclosure under power of sale is
carried through without a court action; if the mortgagee has to sue for possession, for a receiver,
for a deficiency judgment, or for confirmation of the sale, court costs and service fees will be
incurred. Of course any provision for compensating the sheriff for mailing notices of the sale
to interested parties will partially offset the saving in service fees.
It may be argued that power of sale reduces foreclosure expense another $5o which is the
usual cost of reference to a master. This was an expense of foreclosure in almost every suit
during the early days of the depression when Chicago court calendars were congested with
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foreclosure is under power of sale may be expected to result in lower attorney's
fees.S The bill does not provide for sheriff's fees for holding sales under power
and it appears that existing fee provisions are inapplicable. 6 While recording
fees and costs of abstracts and opinions of title7 seem to be unaffected by the
proposed bill, costs of advertising the sale should be less than under the present
system since the bill does not require notice by publication to interested parties
whose residences cannot be discovered by diligent search and inquiry."
Finally, machinery set up by the new bill is not as time-consuming as that
now used in Illinois. Heretofore, foreclosure by action has generally involved
a minimum delay of ninety days from the time the action is started until the
sale under the court decree. Foreclosure under power of sale will make it pos-
sible to hold the sale in forty days.9 Other advantages of foreclosure under
foreclosure actions and judges were unable to hear the evidence in every case. Since the con-
gestion has now been relieved, reference to a master has been eliminated in most cases. At-
torneys state that it seldom occurs in downstate foreclosures.
5 Chicago attorneys follow quite closely the Chicago Bar Association schedule. It provides
for attorney's fees of 7 per cent on the first $5,ooo, 5 per cent on the next $5,ooo, and 4 per cent
on the next $i5,ooo. This means a $350 attorney fee for a $5,ooo mortgage. Compare this,
however, with the $125 attorney fee expense reported by the HOLC for its Illinois foreclosure
operations. Russell, HOLC Survey of Foreclosure Operations 22 (1937).
The time spent by an attorney in foreclosing a mortgage by court action may vary con-
siderably. In the average proceeding on a $5,ooo mortgage in which the mortgagor defaults,
he spends about twenty hours. Power of sale should eliminate about a third of the work in-
volved in foreclosing by court action.
6 Failure to provide compensation for the sheriff or master who sells under power reduces
foreclosure expense. But this reduction can hardly be attributed to any inherent economy in
foreclosing under power of sale since it merely amounts to an arbitrary denial of fees for
services which still must be performed. Nothing prevents such a reduction in expenses of court
foreclosure if the legislature is willing to take away sheriffs' and masters' fees for conduct of
court foreclosures.
Undoubtedly some later provision will set the commission to be received by sheriffs and
masters for conducting sales under power. Commissions may be increased in view of the
added duties imposed on them in conducting such sales, such as sending notices to interested
parties and recording the numerous steps in the proceeding.
7 The HOLC reports an average cost in Illinois of $47.89 for securing an opinion of title or
an abstract. Discussion with Chicago attorneys reveals that they usually pay around $75.
The provision in the act, applying to both power of sale and foreclosure by action, that makes
it unnecessary to give notice to a judgment creditor who has not recorded his judgment lien
will reduce the expense of a search to some extent. §§ 46, 13. But it is difficult to see how the
provision for power of sale will reduce these fees. In the distant future costs of examining titles
may be lessened because the documents which it is necessary to investigate in order to de-
termine the validity of a foreclosure will be less bulky than if foreclosure had been by court
action.
8 The cost of notifying parties who could not be personally served with summons is part
of foreclosure expense in almost every suit. It accounts for about one-half of the $3o spent
for advertising.
9 This assumes that the sheriff acts with utmost speed. He can add twenty days to this time,
however. The statute does not compel him to start publication of the sale notices until ten
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
power of sale have been asserted, such as lower interest rates and easy mortgage
credit, but the evidence in support of these claims is speculative and often con-
flicting.io
In the interest of a more complete understanding of the provision for fore-
closure under power of sale in the new Real Estate Mortgage Act," it is pro-
posed in the remainder of this note to discuss in detail certain aspects of the
bill, namely Article V (Sections 41-53), which provide for notice of the sale,
determination of controversies arising in connection with the sale, conduct of
the sale, disposition of the proceeds of the sale, and the marketability of a
title dependent upon a purchase under the statutory power of sale.
PROVISION FOR NOTICE TO INTERESTED PARTIES
As indicated above the Illinois bill requires notice to be mailed to the mort-
gagor, subsequent encumbrancers, and judgment lienholders who have recorded
their interests.12 Arguments can be made against such a requirement: that in
days after receiving the direction to sell. He can add a second ten days by setting the date of
the sale at the maximum of fifty days after the first publication rather than at the minimum
of forty days. § 48.
.o Foreclosure expense has little bearing on mortgage interest rates. See Handbook of the
National Conference of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and Proceedings 256
(3 2d Annual Meeting, 1922); National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
Consideration in Committee of Whole of Proposed Uniform Real Estate Mortgage Act 44
(1938). But high foreclosure costs tend to reduce the quantity of mortgage credit available
in a particular area. President's Conference on Home Building and Home Ownership, Home
Finance and Taxation 94 (1932).
" The Illinois act is applicable only to mortgages executed after the act is passed. § 4i.
But the draftsman for the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws saw fit to expressly provide
that parties to a mortgage already in existence may agree to allow foreclosure by power of sale
by means of a written agreement to that effect. Model Power of Sale Mortgage Foreclosure
Act (final corrected copy) § 2(1) (1940).
In Illinois the parties could presumably accomplish this result by cancelling the existing
mortgage and making a new one containing the authority to foreclose under power of sale.
Under both acts the mortgagee would perhaps have to give some consideration for this con-
cession if it is to be binding on the mortgagor.
12 §§ 46,48,32. Noticeof the sale need not be sent to judgment lienorswho have not recorded
their interest in a manner specially provided for in the act. § 13.
It is possible that even in the absence of a statutory requirement for giving notice the
Illinois courts might hold a sale irregular where notice had not been given to the mortgagor.
See Barnes v. Freed, 342 Ill. 73, x73 N.W. 795 (1930).
Many courts, however, will set aside a sale if it appears that the mortgagee fraudulently
attempted to conceal notice of the sale from the mortgagor in order to get the property at a
low price. Lipsey v. Cross, 63 S.D. 185, 257 N.W. 125 (i934); Lunde v. Irish, 5o N.D. 312,
195 N.W. 825 (1923).
Statutes in many states do not require notice to the mortgagor or subsequent encumbrancers
and lienholders: Ala. Code Ann. (Michie, Supp. 1936) C. 321, § 9017; Cal. Civ. Code (Deering,
1937) § 2924 b (provision for notice to creditors if they file a request for it); D. C. Code (1929)
§ 205; Mass. Stats. Ann. (1933) c. 244, § 14; Mich. Comp. Laws (1929) § 14427 (posting of
notice on premises is required); Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927) § 9604 (requires service of notice
on the actual occupant of the land); Miss. Code Ann. (1930) § 2167; Mo. Rev. Stat. (1929)
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the ordinary case the mortgagor, knowing of the default, is put on inquiry as
to the possibility of a sale;'3 that subsequent encumbrancers and judgment cred-
itors have no more right to require a prior creditor to give them notice of an
intention to realize on his security by sale under power than when property
is sold on execution,'4 and in the great majority of cases they do not bid at the
sale or redeem from it; that such a requirement operates to destroy an advantage
of foreclosure under power since it requires a careful search of title to determine
those who must be notified of the sale, and in addition makes the purchaser's
title subject to suits to redeem by parties who through error were not given
notice of the sale.5 On the other hand, considerations in favor of the notice
requirement would seem to outweigh the disadvantages. The requirement, as
set out in the bill, protects the mortgagor where the mortgagee dishonestly or
negligently attempts to foreclose when in fact a valid defense exists, or when the
debtor is not in default. Notice is necessary if the period of redemption is to
enable the mortgagor to refinance his mortgage; and, furthermore, notice to
§ 3076; N.H. L. 1933, c. x61, § 3, p- 227; N.C. Code Ann. (Michie, 1939) § 687; R.I. Gen. Laws
Ann. (1938) C. 442, § 18; S.D. Code (1939) § 37.3004; Tenn. Code Ann. (Michie, 1938) § 7793;
Tex. Stat. (Vernon, 1936) art. 381o; Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1936) § 567; W.Va. Code Ann.
(Michie & Sublett, 1937) § 3707; Wis. Stat. (1937) §§ 297.04, 272.31; Wyo. Rev. Stat. Ann.
(Courtright, 1931) §71-207.
In certain circumstances, courts have set aside sales under power for failure to notify subse-
quent encumbrancers or judgment creditors even though the statute regulating foreclosure
under power of sale did not require notice to be given them. Cassaday v. Wallace, 102 Mo. 575,
15 S.W. 138 (i89o); Sandier v. Silk, 292 Mass. 493, I98 N.E. 749 (1935) (where the mortgagee
in foreclosing failed to notify an attaching creditor of the sale of the property as part of a
scheme to defeat the attaching creditor who had requested notice of any sale, the attaching
creditor can sue for damages in tort for wrongful and negligent foreclosure); Levin v. Reliance
Co-operative Bank, x6 N.E. (2d) 88 (Mass. 1938) (where a creditor has asked for notice of
a sale under power, failure to give notice gives him a cause of action for damages on a negli-
gence theory); Goudy v. Cameron State Bank, 2 S.W. (2d) 971 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) (where
subsequent creditor telephoned the bank which held a first mortgage on the property and was
not told that the bank was then proceeding to foreclose under power of sale, this failure to act
fairly and tell the creditor of the foreclosure, when coupled with inadequacy of price, justifies
setting aside the sale).
See also Bon v. Graves, 216 Mass. 440, IO3 N.E. 1023 (i914) (second mortgagee allowed
to set aside a sale under powerwhere the first mortgagee in foreclosing failed to give notice of the
sale to third parties who had expressed an intention to bid at the sale).
r3 It seems highly unrealistic to argue that the mortgagor is likely to fiid out about the
sale through the newspaper advertisement of it. Courts have generally allowed sale notices to
be published in legal notice publications with circulation as low as x8o and reaching only
lawyers and not the members of the general public. Judah v. Pitts, 333 Mo. 3O, 62 S.W. (2d)
715 (1933); Baldwin v. Brown, 193 Cal. 345, 224 Pac. 462 (1924) (paper circulation of only i8o
in a city of z6,ooo); Moss v. Keary, 23 1 Mich. 295, 204 N.W 9 3 (1925) (legal notice paper with
circulation of 4oo in the city of Detroit).
14 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1939) c. 77, § 14.
IS Several authorities think that if actual notice must be given to all interested parties,
i.e., the mortgagor, subsequent creditors and lienholders, that much of the inconvenience of
foreclosure in equity is retained. Durfee and Doddridge, Redemption from Foreclosure Sale--
The Uniform Mortgage Act, 23 Mich.L. Rev. 825 (1925).
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subsequent encumbrancers and creditors is essential if the threat of redemp-
tion by them is to be effective in forcing the mortgagee to make an adequate
bid for the property.,6 Notice is also necessary if any of the interested parties
is to be able to protect his rights in any surplus arising from the sale.
Since notice to the mortgagor and subsequent encumbrancers is essential,
it is important to determine whether these parties are as likely to receive notice
of a proceeding to foreclose under power of sale as of a proceeding to foreclose
by court action. In addition to requiring advertisement of the sale in a news-
paper, the bill requires notice of the sale to be mailed to each interested party.
Only the New York statute regulating foreclosure under power of sale has this
desirable safeguard.'1 It is true the mortgagee can negligently or fraudulently
omit the name of an interested party from the direction to sell, or the sheriff
may fail to mail a notice to a party listed in the direction to sell.' And it can
be said that the bill, by providing a simple method of foreclosure, encourages
laymen to conduct foreclosures without the aid of legal advice and thus in-
creases the likelihood that notice will not be mailed to 'an interested party
through error. But if there are any omissions, the interests of the persons who
are omitted remain unaffected by the foreclosure. One suggestion can be made,
however, with respect to the provision for notice by mail, which is that the bill
require notice of the sale to be sent by registered mail, thus providing the
sheriff with evidence of the sending and receiving of the notice.'9
THE OPPORTUNITY FOR INTERESTED PARTIES TO PRESENT
THEIR DEFENSES BEFORE SALE
An adequate method of foreclosure must give interested parties an oppor-
tunity to present defenses to the foreclosure before rather than after the sale
is held. Such an opportunity prevents economic waste caused when a sale is
x6 See Redemption from Judicial Sales: A Study of the Illinois Statute, 5 Univ. Chi. L. Rev.
625, 627 (I938).
1 The New York statute requires notice of the sale to be served on the mortgagor and his
wife, and a subsequent grantee or mortgagee who has recorded his interest. N.Y. Cons. Laws
(McKinney, 1937) c. 52, § 541.
18 When foreclosure is by court action a subsequent purchaser will be protected if he bought
property relying on the record and if the record is regular on its face even though the sheriff
made a false return of service on some necessary party. i Reeves, Mortgages and Foreclosures
in Illinois 537, 538 (1932). See Rivard v. Gardner, 39 111. 125 (x866); Jones v. Neely, 82 III. 71
(1876); Lancaster v. Snow, x84 Ill. 534, 56 N.E. 813 (i9oo).
When foreclosure is under the power of sale given in the new act, the mortgagor will lose
recourse against the property if there is a false statement that notice has been mailed to the
mortgagor, provided the courts give effect to § 51 protecting the purchaser without notice
from any defect in the sale.
'9 Undoubtedly mbrtgagors will sue to set aside sales on the grounds that they did not re-
ceive the notice mailed to them, and sympathetic courts are likely to oblige by allowing
mortgagors to redeem. This seems unfair where the mortgagor really did receive notice; it will
be extremely difficult, however, for the mortgagee to prove this. The registered mail return
receipt furnishes an excellent way .f settling these controversies and of preventing the per-
petration of fraud by the mortgagor.
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held and later set aside, enables the mortgagor to object before the rights of an
innocent purchaser intervene, and encourages the bidding by third parties at
the sale by assuring them that any purchase is not likely to be set aside. In
foreclosure by action, interested parties receive notice of the judicial hearing,
at which time objections may be raised before a decree is entered. When fore-
closure proceedings are started under power of sale, most states enable a mort-
gagor to present his defenses by allowing him to enjoin a proposed sale.2°
The proposed legislation in Illinois does not mention the right to enjoin;
instead, it allows an interested party, including the mortgagor, to bring a sum-
mary proceeding to resolve any controversy relating to the sale.21 It is prob-
able that early Illinois cases-those decided under the old power of sale provi-
sions-will be persuasive in permitting the mortgagor to use the injunction
remedy. If injunctions are granted where the mortgagor has a valid objection-
and if courts are not too strict in requiring injunction bonds or tender of the
amount admittedly due2-it would seem that the mortgagor will have as satis-
factory a means of raising objections to a foreclosure as he has when foreclosure
is by court action.24 The proposed bill does not obviate the danger that injunc-
tions may be granted too freely, thus destroying any advantage to be gained
in attempting to foreclose under power of sale. That such a danger is real
seems to be evidenced by statutes passed in several states restricting the right
to enjoin.25 Putting this problem to the courts as it does, the adequacy of the
20 Union Central Life Ins. Co. of Cincinnati v. Thompson, 229 Ala. 433, I57 So. 852 ('934);
Gerdes v. Burnham, 78 Minn. 5ir, 81 N.W. 516 (igoo); Soufal v. Griffith, x59 Minn. 252,
198 N.W. 807 (1924); Cocke v. Bank of Dawson, i8o Ga. 714, i8o S.E. 711 ('935).
2X, § 8J.
-Long v. Pomeroy, 8 N.E. 194 (Ill. S. Ct. 1886) (mortgage had been satisfied, so court
enjoined sale). See Stevens v. Shannahan, i6o 111.330,43 N.E. 350 (896); Ryan v. Newcomb,
z25 Ill. 9z, i6 N.E. 887 (1888).
23 The Illinois statute leaves it to the discretion of the court to determine whether an in-
junction bond should be required in cases where the suit is not to enjoin enforcement of a
judgment. Ill. Rev. Stat. (g39) c. 69, § 9.
24 If the mortgagee disregards an injunction or bill to redeem and makes the sale, the pur-
chaser's title is subject to the decree of the court. Lindley v. Easley, 59 S.W. (2d) 927 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1932); Union Central Life Ins. Co. of Cincinnati v. Thompson, 229 Ala. 433, 157
So. 852 (1934); Pattillo v. Tucker, 216 Ala. 572, I13 So. x (1927).
In Ryan v. Newcomb, 125 Ill. 9i, 16 N.E. 878 (1888), an Illinois court held that a sale under
power did not bar the mortgagor's right to redeem if the mortgagor, at the time of the sale,
had a suit pending which alleged that the mortgagor owed nothing; and that he can redeem
even though it turns out that he did owe something at the time of the sale. But see the limita-
tion on this in Stevens v. Shannahan, 16o II. 330, 43 N.E. 350 (1896).
2s In South Dakota an injunction can no longer be obtained in an ex parte hearing. Barg-
mann v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 6o S.D. 255, 244 N.W. 324 (1932). See Johnson v.
Wheeler, 174 Md. 531, 99 Atl. 502 (i938); Tenn. Code Ann. (Michie, 1938 )§ 10535; Md. Ann.
Code (Bagby, 1924) art. 66, § 16. The statute promulgated by the Home Owners' Loan Cor-
poration requires the mortgagor seeking to enjoin a sale to put up a $25o bond, or io per cent
of the mortgage debt, whichever is higher. A New Proposal for a Uniform Real Estate Mort-
gage Act, 86 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 517, 522 (1938).
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bill in this respect depends on a wise exercise of judicial discretion in preventing
abuse. It has been suggested that the courts should rely on the penalty of
costs26 as a sufficient deterrent to groundless suits and should not require the
debtor to give an injunction bond or tender the amount admittedly due. An-
other possibility would be that if suit for the injunction is brought early enough,
a hearing might be held before the sale; if the time is too short for a hearing,
the mortgagor could be required to show why he failed to apply for an injunc-
tion earlier.27
ADVERTISEMENT AND CONDUCT OF THE SALE
The provisions in the proposed Illinois bill regulating advertisement and
conduct of the sale are on the whole satisfactory, yet it seems worth while in
this discussion to mention the minor defects which appear to exist. Section 48,
requiring the sheriff to publish notice of the sale, allows the last notice to be
published as much as thirty days before the sale is held. Decisions and statutes
in several states take what would seem to be the better view that the last
notice should be published in the week or ten days immediately preceding the
sale, thus attracting more bidders than a notice published long before the
sale.2 1 Section 49, specifying in detail the contents of the notice, does not-as
would seem desirable on the basis of the experience in other states-require the
existence of prior liens and encumbrances to be set forth.29
The bill does not provide that the advertisement shall contain the terms of
the foreclosure sale, what they shall be, or who shall determine them.3O Since
the notice of the sale need state only the names of the mortgagor and mortgagee
as they appear in the mortgage, it does not have to include the name of an
assignee of the mortgage who may be the real party in interest. Inclusion of
26 A New Proposal for a Uniform Real Estate Mortgage Act, 86 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 517, 522
(1938).
27 A Minnesota statute provided for this. Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927) § 9387.
28 Crump v. Tucker, 149 Miss. 711, 115 So. 397 (1928) (sale more than one week after last
publication void); Miss. Code Ann. (193o) § 2167; Mo. Rev. Stat. (1929) § 3077 (last inser-
tion not more than one week before the sale); N.Y. Cons. Laws (McKinney, 1937) c. 52,
§ 541 (published for twelve weeks "immediately preceding the day of sale").
29 Misstatement in the advertisement of the sale of the amount of liens prior to the one
under which foreclosure is being made will justify setting aside the sale. Grace v. Noel Mill
Co., 63 S.W. 246 (Tenn. 1gox); Pearson v. Gooch, 69 N.H. 208, 4o Ati. 390 (1897). Nor will a
purchaser be required to complete the sale if he purchases under a belief that he is getting
the property free from prior Hens. Fransen v. State, 59 S.D. 432, 24 o N.W. 503 (1932). See
Sims v. Etheridge, 169 Ga. 400, 150 S.E. 647 (1929) (purchaser cannot be compelled to com-
plete purchase when advertisement of sale does not call attention to fact that foreclosure is
subject to a prior senior lien; also, mortgagee in conducting such a sale must offer the property
subject to this lien and not require cash payment of the senior lien by the purchaser).
When foreclosure is by court action, the foreclosure decree usually states the Hens or en-
cumbrances to which the sale is subject.
30 When foreclosure is by action, most courts define the terms of the sale in the foreclosure
decree. The sale is usually required to be for cash.
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such a provision would seem to be desirable to provide a further opportunity for
the real party in interest to receive notice.
Three provisions in Section 5o regulate the sheriff's conduct of the sale.
Here again several suggestions can be made as to minor defects which may
raise problems. The first provision requires the mortgaged property to be sold
in separate tracts "if it is susceptible of division." This provision seems to re-
quire sale of property in small parcels even though it may be more advan-
tageous to the mortgagor to have it sold en masse, although practice under a
similar provision in the existing Illinois statute3 ' relating to execution sales is
to offer for sale first any part of the premises and then the whole. To resolve
doubts on this matter it would seem advisable that Section 5o expressly set out
details of the practice.
The second provision regulating conduct of the sale allows the sheriff, with
the consent of the mortgagee, to adjourn the sale by an oral announcement to
this effect. No provision is made requiring readvertisement of the sale should
it be adjourned to a distant date.32 Finally, by this section the person conduct-
ing the sale is permitted to discontinue the sale at the direction of the mort-
gagee.
One general comment with respect to the provisions relating to publication
of notice and conduct of the sale should be made. While the sheriff and mort-
gagee are given discretion in certain matters, such as adjournment and selection
of a newspaper in which to advertise, the bill imposes no penalty for abuse of
discretion. For instance, what is to prevent the sheriff from publishing notice
of the sale in a newspaper with a small circulation, published in a distant part
of the county and having little circulation in the neighborhood of the land?
Suit on the sheriff's bond seems inadequate because of the difficulty of showing
damages. The same problem exists with respect to the mortgagee's discretion
in these matters, e.g., as to adjourning the sale. If the mortgagee influences
the sheriff in making his decisions, the bill does not impose upon him a duty
of good faith.33 Fairness in conduct of the sale could be assured if the Illinois
31 Ill. Rev. Stat. (i939) c. 77, § 12.
32 The Illinois provisions relating to execution sales would seem to be in point here. The
provision dealing with sale of real property on execution does not give the sheriff power to
adjourn a sale, but would seem to require readvertisement of the sale if adjourned since it pro-
vides that no sale shall be held unless the time and place of the sale has been advertised for
three weeks. Ill. Rev. Stat. (1939) c. 77, § 14.
An early Illinois case required complete readvertising of an adjourned sale under power
where the trust deed provided for "3o days" advertisement of the sale. Thornton v. Boyden,
31 Ill. 200 (1863); Griffin v. Marine Co. of Chicago, 52 Ill. 3o (1869).
33 The act sets the stage for giving the mortgagee substantial influence over the sheriff or
master in the conduct of the sale. It provides that a mortgagee can give the direction to sell
to a sheriff or master. § 47. This enables the mortgagee to pick the person who will hold the
sale. As the act now stands no provision is made for compensating the sheriff for conducting
a sale under power; it is likely that some provision will later be made for this. When com-
pensation is provided for holding sales, it is likely that sheriffs and masters will be anxious to
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courts would disregard statements in early cases3 4 and set aside sales for any
irregularity even though it has not caused damage.
APPLICATION OF THE PROCEEDS OF THE SALE; DEFICIENCY DECREES
By Section 52 of the bill the sheriff is directed to cancel the evidences of in-
debtedness and mortgage if the debt is paid, and to apply proceeds of the sale,
first to the payment of sale costs, and then to the payment of the mortgaged
indebtedness and any subordinate liens. The section would seem to be open,
however, to two constructions with regard to the sheriff's duty to pay any
subordinate lien upon the property sold. One construction would be that the
sheriff hold the proceeds of the sale for thirty days and pay it to the mortgagor
unless a subsequent encumbrancer seeks to enforce a proper claim. This con-
struction would not seem unduly harsh since subsequent encumbrancers and
lienholders have received notice of the sale, and, therefore, notice of the possi-
bility that there might be a surplus. At any event, following this construction,
if any controversy arises over the amount or priority of any lien, or if the sheriff
is uncertain how to apply the money, the parties may settle the controversy by
means of a summary proceeding.3 5
A different construction would be that the sheriff has an affirmative duty
to determine whether subsequent encumbrances exist when no one has asserted
a claim. This construction seems to be supported by the mandatory language
hold sales and will be eager to follow the mortgagee's advice in determining matters within his
discretion.
In other states where the mortgagee conducts the sale high standards of fairness and reason-
ableness are set for him. Lange v. MacIntosh, 340 Mo. 247, 100 S.W. (2d) 457 (937) (trustee
under trust deed, seeing property is being sold for mere tithe of its value, has a duty to adjourn
the sale and await more auspicious circumstances); Carilla v. Hersey, 12 N.E. (2d) 68 (Mass.
1937) (adjournment was not a violation of the mortgagee's duty of good faith and diligence);
Guels v. Stark, 264 S.W. 693 (Mo. 1924) (where mortgagee makes an error in advertising a
sale, and where in attempting to remedy the error by an oral announcement at the sale he
deters bidders, he should postpone the sale); Tedlock v. Torbert, 89 Okla. 218, 215 Pac. 196
(1923) (sale set aside where conducted in an ambiguous manner so that purchasers did not
know whether they were taking subject to tax liens); Borth v. Proctor, 219 S.W. 72 (Mo.
x9ig) (sale set aside where seller knew someone was interested in buying the property yet sold
it exactly at one o'clock as advertised, although the other party arrived a minute later).
See Kavolsky v. Kaufman, 273 Mass. 418, 173 N.E. 499 (1930) (failure by mortgagee to change
terms of a sale when he sees that it deters bidders shows lack of fairness in conducting the sale);
Chartrand v. Newton, 296 Mass. 317, 5 N.E. (2d) 421 (1936); Wheeler v. Slocinski, 82 N.H. 211,
131 At. 598 (1926).
Since in actuality the mortgagee will control sales under power in Illinois through his
influence over the sheriff or master, ultimate responsibility for fair conduct of the sale should
be placed on him. Only if this is done will fair conduct of sales be assured. See Fransen v. State,
59 S.D. 432, 240 N.W. 503 (1932).
34 Cases cited in note 46 infra.
35 Section 81 provides that in case any controversy arises as to the existence or amount of
any lien upon or interest in the property sold, any person whose rights are affected by such con-
troversy, including the officer who is making the sale if his rights and duties are involved, may
have the controversy determined in a summary proceeding.
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of Section 52.36 Moreover, the bill directs the sheriff to apply the residue "to
the payment in order of priority, of any liens .... which were subordinate to
the mortgage." This provision seems to include judgment lienors who have
not recorded their interest as provided in Section 13 of the bill, and who, there-
fore, will not have received notice of the sale. Suppose further that the sheriff
applies to the court for determination of this issue, as the statute allows him
to do, and suppose no one answers the suit, does the court investigate the
amount and priority of the claims without any parties before it, or is the money
simply turned over to the mortgagor?
Such a construction of Section 52, placing on the sheriff additional burdens,
seems undesirable and perhaps unlikely, although, it is submitted, the prob-
lem exists.37 The ambiguous character of the section could perhaps be avoided
if the bill contained the provision adopted by the draftsman for the Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws, which states that the sheriff shall retain the
surplus for thirty days and then pay it to the owner of the equity of redemption
unless prevented by an order of court or garnishment.38
No provision is made in the bill for the mortgagee to collect attorney fees
out of the sale proceeds. When foreclosure is by action, the court will add to
the decree the sum agreed upon by the parties, or fix a reasonable fee itself,
as compensation for the mortgagee's attorney.39 Under the act attorney fees
cannot be deducted from the sale proceeds, unless the courts allow the parties
to contract that the mortgagee's attorney expense shall constitute part of the
"costs of the sale" or of the "mortgage indebtedness." A further difficulty
arises that if this is allowed, there is no restraint on excessive fees,40 nor does
the act keep a mortgagee from padding the bill for costs of the sale.41
The mortgagee who forecloses under power of sale can, under Section ri i
36The section provides that the sheriff "shall" apply the proceeds to the payment of sub-
ordinate liens in the order of their priority.
37 If the sheriff must apply the surplus arising on the sale to any subordinate lien even
though the lienor does not make application for payment, it would seem necessary for the
sheriff to employ an attorney to discover liens-a burdensome task, especially if it includes a
search of the judgment rolls.
38 Model Power of Sale Mortgage Foreclosure Act (final corrected copy) § 6 (1940).
39 2 Reeves, Mortgages and Foreclosures in Illinois §§ 596-603 (1932).
40 Some statutes provide that the mortgagee is entitled to add to the mortgage indebted-
ness an attorney's fee. Usually the statute restricts the amount that can be so deducted
from the sale proceeds. See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws (1929) § 14445 ($500 or less, $r5 fee;
all sums over $Soo and not exceeding $i,ooo, $25 fee; all sums over $i,ooo, a $35 fee; these
sums can be included as part of the costs and added on to the amount bid at the sale).
41 To safeguard mortgagors from this type of oppression, the Minnesota statute provides
that within ten days after a sale, the mortgagee must file an affidavit of a detailed bill of costs
and disbursements including attorney's fees. Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927) § 9620. Within one
year, the mortgagor may sue and recover three times the amount of any sums charged as costs
or disbursements but not absolutely paid. Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927) § 9621. For failure to
file the affidavit in ten days, the mortgagee must return to the mortgagor any sums retained
out of the sale proceeds for printing expense or attorney's fees. Johnson v. Northwestern
Loan and Building Co., 60 Minn. 393, 62 N.W. 381 (z895). That the overcharge was made in
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of the bill, obtain a deficiency decree in a suit to confirm the sale. The mort-
gagor, however, is given the right to claim as a credit the fair value of the
property where the mortgagee, and not an outsider, bought at the sale. The
decree obtained in such a suit can be used to support a levy of execution. By
making the claim for a deficiency an incident of a suit to confirm, the deficiency
action seems to become an equitable one so that the issue of fair market value
does not have to be submitted to a jury. If the bill had provided merely for the
right to sue for a deficiency it could have been argued that this remedy was
in its nature an action at law in which the mortgagor was entitled to a jury
trial of the value issue. Jury valuation might mean, insofar as juries are sym-
pathetic to debtors, that no deficiency could be obtained if foreclosure were
made by means of power of sale.
WMIRKETABILITY OF TITLE OBTAINED AT A FORECLOSURE
UNDER POWER
When a foreclosure proceeding under power is strictly in accordance with
the proposed act, it is, by Section 51, to be given the same effect as a sale made
pursuant to a decree in a foreclosure suit in which the court had jurisdiction
of the subject matter and of the parties. Since the mortgagor is given notice
of the proceedings to foreclose and a right to have any controversy determined
by a summary action before the sale, it would seem to follow that the purchaser
at the sale is protected against any subsequent raising of defenses to the mort-
gage, e.g., failure of consideration, by the mortgagor.42 This construction, how-
ever, raises the question whether the notice of the sale may be considered ade-
quate to make it clear to the mortgagor that he can object to the enforceability
of the mortgage only before the sale. This doubt could be easily resolved by
stating in the notice that the sale would cut off his defenses to the mortgage
unless objection were made beforehand.
When foreclosure under power is not in accordance with the provisions in
the act, Section 5X provides that no irregularity shall affect the validity of the
sale as to any person not having notice of the defect. In view of the con-
struction placed on a similar provision in the Illinois statute relating to execu-
tion sales, perhaps the courts will set aside a sale if the purchaser had notice
of the irregularity relied upon. 43 However, a study of the cases decided under
good faith is no defense in an action for triple damages. Hobe v. Swift, 58 Minn. 84, 59
N.W. 831 (1894). But failure to file the affidavit does not affect the validity of the sale.
Johnson v. Cocks, 37 Minn. 530 (1887).
42 Such a construction would be desirable from the point of view of making titles derived
from foreclosures under power of sale equally secure as those obtained in a foreclosure action.
In practice this rule is no harsher than that applied in foreclosure actions where the mortgagor
is required to raise his defenses to the foreclosure at the judicial hearing or else be barred.
Fuhrmann v. Fanroth, 254 N.Y. 479, 173 N.E. 685 (X930); Stewart v. Phoenix Nat'l Bank,
49 Ariz. 34, 64 P. (2d) 1oI (,937).
43 The provision on execution sales first imposes a $5o penalty on an officer who fails to
follow the statutory regulations governing sales on execution; it then provides "nor shall any
irregularity on the part of the sheriff or other officer having the execution, be deemed to affect
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the execution sale provision is not helpful in solving the further problem of
what irregularities will be held to justify setting aside a sale under power.
Other jurisdictions have adopted one of two solutions. Some courts hesitate
to set aside a sale for mere irregularities which have not caused damage, arguing
that there has been substantial compliance with the statute and that the defect
is not prejudicial or misleading.44 Other courts, however, set aside a sale for
any non-compliance with the statute.45 While the first view avoids the waste
involved in reselling property where there has been no substantial injury, it has
the disadvantage of removing the only sanction insuring compliance with the
statutory regulations and thus gives only a directory effect to the statute.
Early Illinois decisions dealing with sales under power indicate a tendency to
favor this view.46 The second view results in economic waste when a second
sale is required merely to punish the mortgagee for failure to comply with the
statute. Provision in Section 51 of the new bill that sale under power shall
have the "same effect" as sales pursuant to a court decree might influence
Illinois courts to follow this second view.47 Furthermore, the difficulty of prov-
ing actual damage or prejudice to have resulted from a particular omission, it
is submitted, makes the strict attitude necessary if the provisions of the act are
to be effectively enforced.
Section 51, as has been noted above, states that "irregularities in connection
with the sale shall [not] affect the validity of the sale." Section 45 of the bill
describes three requisites to a sale as "conditions" in the absence of which no
the validity of the sale made under it unless it shall be made to appear that the purchaser had
notice." Ill. Rev. Stat. (i939) c. 77, § i5. The courts set aside such sales for irregularities
where the purchaser has notice. Barnes v. Freed, 342 Ill. 73, 173 N.E. 795 (1930); Weaver v.
Peasley & Co., 163 III. 251, 45 N.E. 119 (1896).
44 Reading v. Waterman, 46 Mich. 107, 8 N.W. 691 (i88z); Lau v. Scribner, 197 Mich.
415, 163 N.W. 914 (1917); Clark v. Duvall, 61 Colo. 76, 156 Pac. 144 (9ig6); Powers v. Kueck-
hoff, 41 Mo. 425 (1867). See 2 Minn. L. Rev. 157 (1918).
45 Wilkinson v. Federal Land Bank of New Orleans, i68 Miss. 645, 15o So. 218 (933);
Gillette v. Abrahams, 42 S.D. 316, 174 N.W. 745 (1919); Clifford v. Tomlinson, 62 Minn.
195, 64 N.W. 381 (I895).
46 Ritchie v. Judd, 137 Ill. 453, 27 N.E. 682 (i891) (one ground for refusing to set aside a
sale where publication of notices had been irregular was that the mortgagor did not show that
anyone was misled by the defective notice); Kerfoot v. Billings, 16o Ill. 563, 43 N.E. 804
(1896) (overstatement of the amount of the indebtedness did not operate to justify setting
aside a sale under power where it did not deter bidders); Hoyt v. Pawtucket Institute for Sav-
ings, iio Ill. 39o (1884) (notice failed to state the precise amount due, but did state it "sub-
stantially"); Fairman v. Peck, 87 Ill. 156 (1877) (overstatement of indebtedness and sale
of property en masse do not justify setting aside a sale under power where no prejudice or
injury is shown); Williamson v. Stone, 128 Ill. 129, 22 N.E. Ioo5 (I889) (sale will be set aside
if there is unfairness, intentional or unintentional, resulting in injury to the debtor).
47 See Quick v. Collins, 197 Ill. 391, 64 N.E. 288 (1902) (where court held it error for the
lower court to confirm a sale not in compliance with its decree ordering sale in a partition pro-
ceedings, stating that where objection is urged on the filing of the master's report before con-
firmation, the sale should not be approved unless in accordance with the decree). But see Illi-
nois Midwest Stock Land Bank v. McMahon, 249 Ill. App. 555 (X928); Springer v. Law,
I85 Ill. 542, 57 N.E. 435 (19OO)-
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sale shall be made.48 The question arises, then, whether Section 51 protects a
purchaser without notice if one of the "conditions," e.g., that the mortgage in-
debtedness has become due, is absent. Decisions in Illinois and other states
have stressed the distinction between mere "irregularities" against which a pur-
chaser in good faith is protected, and "conditions," the absence of which makes
the sale absolutely null and void even as to a bona fide purchaser.49 If the ab-
sence of any of these conditions is held to make the sale void even as to a sub-
sequent remote purchaser, the security of titles derived from sales under power
is weakened to the point of making it dangerous to foreclose or purchase at
such a sale. Strong arguments, however, can be advanced against distinguishing
irregularities from conditions. It is not likely that the drafters of the Illinois
bill intended Section 45, dealing with conditions, to be the basis of such a dis-
tinction, because one of the purposes of Section 51 is to protect the purchaser
without notice.50 Section 51 itself provides by implication that one of the con-
ditions-that notice of the sale shall be given-does not make the sale invalid
as to a purchaser without notice. It seems, therefore, that the subsequent pur-
chaser is protected even though one of the other two conditions set forth in
Section 45 for a sale may be absent.
Another problem raised by this provision of the bill protecting a "purchaser
without notice of the irregularity" is the meaning of the words "without
notice." If the mortgagee purchases at the sale it seems unlikely that the
court will regard him as a purchaser without notice, even though he may not
know of the particular irregularity relied upon in the suit to set aside the sale.
The provision protecting the purchaser without notice is copied from the Illi-
nois statute relating to execution sales, and, in construing that act, the courts
have held that the judgment debtor who purchases on execution is charged with
48 Section 45 reads: "Conditions. No sale shall be made unless (i) the mortgage has been
recorded, (2) the entire mortgage indebtedness has become due, whether by acceleration or
otherwise, and (3) notice of sale shall have been given as hereinafter provided."
49 Bausman v. Kelley, 38 Minn. 197, 36 N.W. 333 (1888) (sale absolutely void and of no
effect, where person purporting to act as attorney of the mortgagor foreclosed a mortgage
under power of sale, even though the records were "fair" on their face, and though subsequent
remote parties had possession of the property at the time of the suit); Rogers v. Barnes, 169
Mass. 179, 47 N.E. 602 (x897) (where property was sold under power of sale when interest
was not in default); Redmond v. Packenham, 66 Ill. 434 (1872) (mortgage debt had been paid
when land was sold under power to a third person). See Fairman v. Peck, 87 Ill. 156 (1877);
Lycoming Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 83 Ill. 302 (1876); Cameron v. Irwin, 5 Hill (N.Y.) 272 (1843);
Chace v. Morse, x89 Mass. 559 (igo5); Shippen v. Whittier, 117 Ill. 282, 7 N.E. 642 (i886).
But see Butler Bldg. & Investment Co. v. Dunsworth, 146 Mo. 36i, 48 S.W. 449 (1898) (sale
to a purchaser in good faith was held valid although mortgage was not in default at the time of
the sale under power); Chicago R.I. & P.R. Co. v. Kennedy, 70 Ill. 350 (1873) •
so Statutes in several states have provisions similar to § 45 of the Illinois bill. Mich. Comp.
Laws (1929) § 14426 (this statute lists the following as "prerequisites" for the exercise of a
power of sale: default in the mortgage, no suit pending at law on the mortgage, mortgage and
all assignments duly recorded); Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927) § 96o3; Wyo. Rev. Stat. Ann.
(Courtright, i93i) § 71-2o6; S.D. Code Ann. (1939) § 37.3002; Wis. Stat. (1939) § 297.02;
N.Y. Cons. Laws (McKinney, 1937) c. 52, § 540. None of the decisions construing these
sections has made a distinction between the effect of these "requisites" and an ordinary "ir-
regularity" in the title.
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notice of all defects in the sale and thus cannot occupy the position of a pur-
chaser without notice.S'
There is even some doubt whether a disinterested third party, not the mort-
gagee, who purchases at the sale will be protected by the act. Early Illinois
decisions involving sales under power held that the immediate purchaser at the
sale was "charged" with notice of all defects and irregularities in the sale.S2
Since the provision in the proposed bill is patterned after the statute relating
to execution sales, decisions construing this act might be followed, and an out-
sider protected from suit to set aside the sale when he has no knowledge of the
defect. But even the cases decided under the execution sale statute go far in
charging the purchaser at the sale with constructive notice.53
The bill is adequate to protect subsequent remote purchasers of property
which has at some time been foreclosed under power of sale. The few decisions
in Illinois and other states dealing with such cases indicate a tendency to favor
the remote purchaser even in doubtful cases.S4 In many jurisdictions subse-
quent remote purchasers are aided in proving their titles by statutory provi-
sions making the certificate of sale prima facie evidence of a regular foreclosure ss
The Illinois proposal does not contain such a provision, but requires the sheriff
3! King v. Cushman, 41 Il. 3I (1866). The court might also find support in early Illinois
cases dealing with foreclosures under power of sale where it was held that anyone purchasing
directly at the sale is charged with notice of the defects in the proceedings. Cassell v. Ross,
33 Ill. 244 (1864). See Gunnell v. Cockerill, 84 Ill. 319 (1876); Hamilton v. Lubukee, 5i Ill.
415 (i869). For similar decisions in other states see Martini v. Emery, 39 R.I. 463, 98 Atl.
52 (I9x6); Hinton v. Hall, i66 N.C. 477, 82 S.E. 847 (1914).
52 Cassell v. Ross, 33 Ill. 244 (1864). See Ritchie v. Judd, 137 111.453, 27 N.E. 682 (i891);
Gunnell v. Cockerill, 84 Ill. 3i9 (1876).
S3 McDaniel v. Wetzel, 264 Ill. 212, io6 N.E. 209 (1914) (no evidence that the third party
purchasing at the sale knew that the notices had not been posted, but the provision relating to
purchasers without notice at execution sales does not mean that a sale may not be set aside
on account of irregularities coupled with gross inadequacy of price). See Logar v. O'Brien,
339 I. 628, i7i N.E. 629 (i93o); Smith v. Huntoon, 134 111. 24, 24 N.E. 971 (i89o); Morris
v. Robey, 73 Ill. 462 (1874); Barnes v. Freed, 342 Ill. 73, 173 N.E. 795 (1930). But see Mc-
Gowan v. Goldberg, 281 Ill. 547, 117 N.E. IO45 (1917); Osgood v. Blackmore, 59 Ill. 261
(z871).
54 Wilson v. South Park Com'rs, 70 Il. 46 (1873); Munn v. Burges, 70 Inl. 604 (1873);
Rideout v. Burkhardt, 255 Mo. 1i6, 164 S.W. 5o6 (1g14); Eubanks v. Brecton, i58 N.C. 230,
73 S.E. ioog (1912); Phipps v. Wyatt, 199 N.C. 727, I55 S.E. 721 (1930); Hinton v. Hall,
x66 N.C. 477, 82 S.E. 847 (1914). See Gunnell v. Cockerill, 84 Ill. 319 (1876); Hamilton v.
Lubukee, 51 Ill. 415 (1869). But see those cases where the purchaser is charged with notice of
the mortgagor's interests if the latter is in possession of the property at the time of the pur-
chase. Clevinger v. Ross, 1o9 Ill. 349 (1884); Logar v. O'Brien, 339 Ill. 628, 171 N.E. 629
(193o) (dealing with an execution sale); Barnes v. Freed, 342 Ill. 73, 173 N.E. 795 (1930)
(dealing with an execution sale).
ss Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1937) § 2924b; Mich. Comp. Laws (1929) §§ 14439, I444;
Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927) §§ 9678, 9622; Mo. Rev. Stat. (1929) § 3094; N.H. Pub. Laws
(1926) C. 215, § 24; N.Y. Cons. Laws (McKinney, 1937) c. 52, §§ 549-51; Va. Code Ann.
(Michie & Sublett, 1936) § 6196; Wis. Stat. (1939) §§ 297.16, 297.17.
The absence of a statutory provision making certain things prima facie evidence of a valid
sale has not prevented courts from doing the same thing by decision. Atkinson v. Washington
and Jefferson College, 54 W.Va. 32, 46 S.E. 253 (19o3); Jones v. Frank, 123 Miss. 280, 85 So.
310 (1920); Smith v. Allbright, 261 S.W. 461 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
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to record evidence of completion of various steps in the foreclosure. 6 The re-
corded copy of the certificate containing notice of sale and of the facts respect-
ing publication and mailing are made "evidence" of the facts stated therein.
The officer conducting the sale is also required to record a duplicate of the
certificate of sale within three days after the sale. This certificate and the
duplicate of it are made evidence of the facts stated therein.57
Security of title obtained on foreclosure under power of sale will probably
be furthered by judicial application of the doctrines of estoppel and laches.58
In several states added protection to title is provided by statutes specially
limiting the time in which suits can be brought to set aside sales under power.5 9
In one state, however, such a provision has been held unconstitutional as to
parties in possession, ° and Illinois decisions6' dealing with a similar problem
s6 § 47 (requires the sheriff to record a copy of the direction to sell); § 48 (requires the
sheriff within three days after the sale to file for record a certificate setting forth a copy of the
notice of the sale and certificate respecting the publication and mailing thereof; such certifi-
cate is made evidence of the facts stated in it).
57 § 75.
s8 Kerfoot v. Billings, x6o Ill. 563, 43 N.E. 8o4 (1896); Gibbons v. Hoag, 95 Ill. 45 (i88o);
McHany v. Schenk, 88 Ill. 357 (1878); Chace v. Morse, 189 Mass. 559, 76 N.E. 142 (i9o5);
Fox v. Jacobs, 289 Mich. 619, 286 N.W. 854 (I939); Debnam v. Watkins, 178 N.C. 238, 100
S.E. 336 (igig); Shelby v. Bowden, x6 S.D. 531, 94 N.W. 46 (i9o3); Northwestern Mortgage
Trust Co. v. Bradley, 9 S.D. 495, 7o N.W. 648 (1897).
But in the following cases the courts held there were no grounds for applying the doctrines
of laches or estoppel: Richards v. Finnegan, 45 Minn. 208, 47 N.W. 788 (i8gi); Sheasgreen
Holding Co. v. Dworsky, 18i Minn. 79, 231 N.W. 395 (1930); Walker v. Carleton, 97 Ill.
582 (i88i); Hammon v. Hatfield, 192 Minn. 259, 256 N.W. 94 (i934); Nelson v. Johnson, 167
Minn. 430, 209 N.W. 320 (1926).
According to one court laches cannot bar a sale that is absolutely void for lack of some
essential condition. Moore v. Dick, 187 Mass. 207, 72 N.E. 967 (rgos).
s9 Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927) § 9623; Miss L. (1934) c. 250; Tenn. Code Ann. (Michie,
1938) §§ 7799, 7800.
The Uniform Mortgage Foreclosure Act allows suit to set aside a sale under power to be
brought before expiration of the period of redemption. Model Power of Sale Mortgage Fore-
closure Act (final corrected copy) § 8 (1). But no such proceeding to set aside the sale, directly
or collaterally, shall be commenced after the expiration of the period of redemption. Ibid.,
§ 8(2).
60 In Hammon v. Hatfield, 192 Minn. 259, 256 N.W. 94 (1934), the mortgagor knew of the
intention to sell a month before the sale but was not served with notice of the sale as required
by statute. The court held that the statute requiring the mortgagor to sue to set aside a sale
with due diligence cannot compel one legally in possession to proceed at law when he is already
in complete enjoyment of all he claims; the statute was held unconstitutional insofar as it
requires one rightfully in possession of the land to bring an action within a specified time to
declare invalid a proceeding to foreclose a mortgage.
Earlier decisions restricted the effect of the statute, holding that it did not apply where the
foreclosure was wholly without authority and void, Bausman v. Kelley, 38 Minn. 197, 36 N.W.
333 (i888), or where there was a failure to record the mortgage and assignments of it as re-
quired by the statute, Burke v. Backus, 51 Min. 174, 53 N.W. 458 (1892).
61 Although the Torrens Act provides that the registration decree shall be binding and con-
clusive on all parties, and that any person having any interest in the land who was not actually
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in the Torrens Act registration cases seem to indicate that any attempt to set
a fixed time limit for bringing suit to set aside a sale under power would not be
enforced.
A final provision of the act dealing with security of title is Section 53,62
which allows the mortgagee to obtain judicial confirmation of the sale. What
effect confirmation has upon the title derived from the sale is not made clear
by the bill. Section 53 expressly states that the sale is valid and fully effective
without confirmation, yet in the following sentence the drafter seems to imply
that the section has special efficacy in barring as to all persons the equitable
right to redeem. If the decisions construing the effect of confirmation of sales
under court decrees are followed, the effect will be slight6 3 A similar provision
in another state has not as yet been construed to have any marked effect in
protecting title from suits to set aside.64 The conclusion would seem to be that
the provision for confirmation is useless.
served with process or notified of the filing of the application may file an answer to the applica-
tion within two years after entry of the decree and not afterward, Ill. Rev. Stat. (1939) C. 30,
§ 7o, the court held in Sheaff v. Spindler, 339 Ill. 540, 171 N.E. 632 (i93o), that this did not
prevent an adverse claimant who was not made a party from later suing to remove as a cloud
on his title the registration decree. See also People ex rel. Kern v. Chase, I65 Ill. 527, 46 N.E.
454 (1897).
6, Section 53 reads as follows: "Confirmation of Sale. Courts of chancery shall have juris-
diction .... to confirm .... any foreclosure sale made as aforesaid under a power of sale
contained in a mortgage, but this shall not be construed to mean that a confirmation must
be had in order that such sale may be valid and fully effective. In any such suit it shall not
be necessary, for the purpose of confirming the foreclosure sale and barring as to all persons
the equitable right to redeem from the mortgage, to make as party to the suit any person .......
63 In Illinois, the judicial confirmation of sales under foreclosure decrees does not have a great
effect in preventing the mortgagor or some other party from raising objections based on irregu-
larities in the sale. Grundy County Natl Bank v. Sanford, 281 Ill. App. 464 (1935) (al-
though the sale was confirmed, the court will set it aside where the master advertised the sale
for one date in some notices and for another date in others; there was no showing of prejudice
arising from this defect); see Illinois Midwest Stock Land Bank v. McMahon, 249 Ill. App.
555 (1928) (court refuses to set aside the sale after confirmation, but states that confirmation
cures any irregularities resulting from departure by the sheriff from the court decree if the
court had power to direct such action in the first instance). If the Illinois Midwest Stock Land
Bank decision is applied to foreclosures under power of sale, no irregularity in the sale could be
cured by the confirmation since the court has no power to dispense with the statutory re-
quirements regulating foreclosure under power of sale. See also Garrett v. Moss, 20 Ill. 549
(1858); Fergus v. Woodworth, 44 Ill. 374 (1867); Gross v. Parker, 137 Ill. App. 313 (1907).
64 Mass. Ann. Laws (1933) c. 244, § 12; W.Va. Code Ann. (Michie & Sublett, 1937) § 3712,
held unconstitutional in Staud v. Sill, 114 W.Va. 2o8, 171 S.E. 428 (1933); Ga. L. (1935) pt. I,
tit. VII, no. 412, § I.
